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Abstract. We give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of symmetric equilib-
rium without ties in interdependent values auctions, with multidimensional independent types
and no monotonic assumptions. In this case, non-monotonic equilibria might happen. When
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions are not satisﬁed, there are ties with positive probability.
In such case, we are still able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibrium with an all-pay
auction tie-breaking rule. As a direct implication of these results, we obtain a generalization
of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. From the robustness of equilibrium existence for all-pay
auctions in multidimensional setting, an interpretation of our results can give a new justiﬁcation
to the use of tournaments in practice.
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1. Introduction
The received literature on pure strategy equilibria on auctions is mainly restricted to the
setting of unidimensional types and monotonic utilities. Although recent eﬀorts have been
made to treat the case of multidimensional types (see McAdams (2003), for instance), the
monotonicity assumption is usually maintained. In dealing with multidimensional types, this is
obviously restrictive (see also our examples in section 5).
Thus, to develop a satisfactory theory of equilibria with multidimensional types, it is necessary
to take in account the possibility of non-monotonic utility functions.
However, even in the unidimensional case, non-monotonic auctions are problematic. To see
why, consider a symmetric ﬁrst-price auction between two buyers with payoﬀ function v(ti,t −i)
= α+ ti+ βt−i and independent types distributed on [0,1].
The received theory ensures the existence of a monotonic pure strategy equilibrium only if
β > 0. See Milgrom and Weber (1982), Maskin and Riley (2000), Athey (2001). If β < 0, we only
know that there exists a tie-breaking rule (endogenously deﬁned) that guarantees the existence
of mixed strategy equilibrium (see Jackson, Simon, Swinkels and Zame (2002), henceforth JSSZ).
That the case β < 0 is problematic can be seen through particular examples. Indeed, if α =5 ,
β = −4 and the distribution is uniform on [0,1], this is exactly example 1 of JSSZ. If α =3 ,
β = −2 and types assume values 0 or 1 with probabilities 2
3 and 1
3, respectively, it is example
3 of Maskin and Riley (2000). Both cases are counterexamples to the existence of equilibrium,
even with special tie-breaking rules. Maskin and Riley (2000) show that there is no equilibrium
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for their example neither under the standard tie-breaking rule (that assigns the object randomly
to tying bidders), nor under the Vickrey auction tie-breaking rule, deﬁned as “if a tie occurs for
the high bid, a Vickrey auction is conducted among the high bidders”. JSSZ make the claim,
corrected in Jackson, Simon, Swinkels and Zame (2004), that there is no tie-breaking rule that
is type-independent and ensures the existence of equilibrium for their example.
Some questions arise from the contrast between the theoretical results for β > 0a n dβ < 0: For
which set of β the standard tie-breaking rule is suﬃcient to ensure the existence of equilibrium? Is
it possible to deﬁne a speciﬁc tie-breaking rule for all β? For which set of β there is no equilibrium
in pure strategy? Are the results valid only for ﬁrst-price auctions? Is the equilibrium unique?
Is the Revenue Equivalence Theorem still valid for β < 0?
The framework of this paper includes JSSZ’s example as a special case. Our results provide
the following answers to the above questions: If β > −1, there exists equilibrium in pure
strategies under the standard tie-breaking rule. If we adopt an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule,
that consists in conducting an all-pay auction among tying bidders in the case of a tie, then
there exists a pure strategy equilibrium for all β (provided α > max{0,−β}, otherwise the
object would have negative values). Moreover, the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule works for all
standard type of auctions and the equilibria obtained under it obey the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem. We also prove that there is a unique equilibrium if β > −1, but there are multiple
equilibria otherwise.
It is important to note that the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is type-independent,i nt h e
sense that it does not require private information. This does not contradict the example of
Jackson et. al. (2004), that does not have equilibrium with type-independent tie-breaking rule.
The reason is that the example is not a standard auction: there is an uncertainty about the
number of objects in the auction.
Our results hold for symmetric auctions with independent non-atomic types, for a wide class
of auction formats where bidders have unitary demands (ﬁrst-price, second-price, all-pay, war of
attrition).1 Moreover, we impose no restriction on the dimension of the set of types and make
no monotonic assumptions about the value of the object. All the answers provided above for the
speciﬁc example are given in a general setting (of weakly separable utilities – see assumption H3
in section 5). Of course, the condition for the equilibrium existence is something more complex
for the general case, but it is still easy to verify.
From the equilibrium existence for all-pay auctions, an interpretation of our results can give
an e wj u s t i ﬁcation to the use of tournaments in practice. Indeed, tournaments (for job or re-
search) are well-modeled as all-pay auctions or war of attrition. We prove that the existence
of equilibrium for these kind of auctions require weaker assumptions than other kind of auction
mechanisms, because they better reveal information. If we are in a situation where the revela-
tion of information is crucial for a strategically stable allocation of the product, then our results
can be read as saying that all-pay auctions are better. It is interesting to observe that the
situations where tournaments are routinely conducted are exactly those where the information
is multidimensional and can be non-monotonic for the players. For instance, the better capac-
ity for conducting a research depends on a multidimensional vector of characteristic: technical
1The non-atomicity is a standard but crucial assumption for our method. Thus, example 3 of Maskin and
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knowledge and abilities, experience, organizational and ﬁnancial structures, criativity, motiva-
tion and even honesty. Such a complex information environment requires a better mechanism
for revelation of information.
Our results are based in what we call indirect auctions, which we describe in subsection 1.1
below.
1.1. The Indirect Auction. For standard auctions, higher bids correspond to higher probabil-
ity of winning. If a bidding function b(·)i sﬁxed and followed by all participants in a symmetric
auction, we can associate to each bid (and thus, to each type), the probability of winning. All
types that bid the same bid under b(·) have the same probability of winning. This allows us
to introduce the concept of conjugation. If b(t)=b(s), and hence, t and s have the same
probability of winning, we say that t and s are conjugated.
Sometimes in the literature, what we call conjugation is named reduced form: “The function
relating a bidder’s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction.” (Border,
1991, p. 1175).2 Therefore, what we will call indirect auction can be also called reduced form
auction. The papers about reduce form auctions analyze problems related to the characterization
and existence of optimal auctions. Hence, the auction is treated, as Myerson (1981) does, only
by considering the probability of winning and the payments. In turn, our problem is to ﬁnd
the equilibrium for ﬁxed auction rules. Moreover, our indirect auction is not equivalent to the
direct one. Thus, it is not merely a reduced form of the auction. (See remarks after Theorem
1 in section 4). In the light of these diﬀerences and in the attempt not to confuse terms, we
d e c i d e dt ou s ead i ﬀerent terminology.
This terminology comes from the Taxation Principle which allows us to implement any direct
truthful mechanism through some convenient indirect one.3 In this case, we are implementing
the equilibrium in the auction using an indirect auction obtained from the reparametrization of
types through the probability of winning.
This method allows us to deal with non-monotonic bidding in equilibrium. Indeed, we give
examples where bidders’ types are multidimensional and the values are non-monotonic.4 An
important part of the method is the necessary condition (i) in Theorem 1, which says that the
types of the bidder choosing the same bid have the same marginal beneﬁt. A similar property
was derived by Araujo and Moreira (2000) in the monopolistic principal-agent screening problem
where non-monotonic optimal contracts emerge.
Returning to the description of our method, the main idea is to reparameterize types and to
associate them to the probability of winning the auction. As stated, this idea seems unpromising
at ﬁrst, since the probability of winning will be diﬀerent for each diﬀerent bidding function that
we begin with. Moreover, if we do not previously ﬁx a bidding function, no conjugation can be
deﬁned.
To overcome these problems, we deﬁne conjugations without using bidding functions, as
a suitable reparametrization of the types. Once we deﬁned conjugations, we can deﬁne the
Indirect Auction.5 For this, we simply integrate the utilities of the direct auction for all types
that are conjugated. From our deﬁnition of conjugation, the indirect auction is now an auction
2See also Matthews (1984) and Chen (1986).
3See Guesnerie (1998).
4See sections 4 and 5.
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with the same format of the direct one (for instance, a ﬁrst-price auction if the original auction
is a ﬁrst-price auction) between two players with independent signals, uniformly distributed on
[0,1]. This makes the analysis of equilibrium existence easier.
In section 2, we describe the model. Section 3 formally presents the indirect auction. Section
4 develops the theory for general auctions, obtaining necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of equilibrium. Section 5 particularizes to the case of weakly separable utilities and
gives a concise condition for equilibrium existence. Moreover, the all-pay auction tie-breaking
rule is introduced and the equilibrium existence proved. As a corollary, we obtain the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem. Section 6 concludes with a discussion about the limitations of our results
and reviews the contributions of the paper in light of the related literature. All proofs are
collected in appendices.
2. The Model
There are N bidders in an auction of L<Nhomogenous objects, but each bidder is in-
terested in just one object. Player i (i =1 ,...,N) receives a private information, ti,p o s s i b l y
multidimensional, and chooses a bid bi ∈ B ≡ {bOUT} ∪ [bmin,+∞), where bmin >b OUT is the
minimal valid bid and if bi = bOUT, bidder i does not participate in the auction and gets a payoﬀ
of 0.
Let t =( ti,t −i) be the proﬁle of all signals and b =( bi,b −i), the proﬁle of submitted bids.
Let b−i
(m) be the m-th order statistic of (b1,...,b i−1,b i+1,...,b N), that is, b−i
(1) > b−i
(2) > ... > b−i
(N−1).
Since there are L objects, the value that determines the winning and loosing events for bidder





. That is, the bidder i receives an object if bi >b (−i) and none if
bi <b (−i).T i e s( bi = b(−i)) are broken by the standard tie-breaking rule, that is, the object is





v(ti,t −i) − pW ¡
bi,b (−i)
¢




, if bi <b (−i)
v(ti,t−i)−bi
m , if bi = b(−i)
where v is the value of the object for all bidders, pW and pL are the payments made in the
events of winning and losing, respectively, and m is the number of bidders tying.
Our setting is given by the following assumptions:
(H0) The types are independent and identically distributed in the same compact set S,
according to a non-atomic probability measure µ on S. v is positive (v>0), continuous and
symmetric in its last N−1 arguments, that is, if t0






The restrictive aspect of (H0) is the symmetry. The others are very natural. For instance,
the assumption that v is positive is not restrictive, since S is compact and, hence, v assumes a
minimum M. Then, if we add M + 1 to the value of the object, v becomes positive.
The speciﬁc auction is determined by pW and pL. We will consider alternatively, two cases.
The ﬁrst one, embodied in (H1)-1 below, cover ﬁrst-price auctions, for instance. The second
case is deﬁned by (H1)-2 and covers second price auctions, among other more exotic formats.
(H1) Over the domain B × B, pW and pL are non-negative, diﬀerentiable, pL (bOUT,·)=0 ,
∂1pW > 0, ∂1pL > 0 and, alternatively:NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 5
(H1)-1: ∂1pW (·) > 0o r∂1pL (·) > 0o r




Observe that assumption (H1) is rather weak. It covers virtually all kind of standard single-
objetc auctions or multi-unit auctions with unitary demands, and allows the use of entry fees.
Some examples are:
(F) First-price auctions: pW ¡
bi,b (−i)
¢




(S) Second-price auctions: pW ¡
bi,b (−i)
¢




(A) All-pay auctions: pW ¡
bi,b (−i)
¢




(W) War of attrition: pW ¡
bi,b (−i)
¢




An active reserve price, that is, bmin that excludes some bidders, makes the statement of our
equilibrium results more complex. So, we will postpone the analysis of this case to Appendix B
and through the paper we will make use of the following assumption:
(H2) v, pW, pL and bmin are such that no bidder plays bOUT, that is, no bidder prefers to
stay out of the auction.
We denote the auction described above by (S,µ,v). Observe that we make no restriction
about the dimension of S. Also, we are considering just symmetric auctions. Thus, throughout
the paper, when we talk about a strategy, we always mean a symmetric one. Under these
assumptions we will introduce a new approach to prove existence of equilibria in auctions. We
call it the “Indirect Auction Approach”. This is the subject of the next section.
3. The Indirect Auction
In the subsection 3.1, we describe the basic element of our method: the conjugation. In
subsection 3.2, the indirect auction is deﬁned and its basic properties derived.
3.1. Conjugations. We will be interested in regular bidding functions as deﬁned below:
Deﬁnition 1. A bounded measurable function b : S → R is regular if the c.d.f.
Fb (c) ≡ Pr{s ∈ S : b(s) <c }
is absolutely continuous and strictly increasing in its support, [b∗,b ∗].
From the fact that Fb (·) is absolutely continuous we conclude that Fb (c)=P r{s ∈ S :
b(s) 6 c}.L e tS denote the set of regular functions. Observe that S contains non-monotonic
bidding functions. It is formed by functions b that do not induce ties with positive probability
(because Fb is absolutely continuous) and that do not have gaps in the support of the bids
(because Fb is increasing).
If a bidding function b ∈ S is ﬁxed, let us call the c.d.f. of the maximum bid of the opponents,
˜ Pb.T h a ti s ,w ed e ﬁne the transformation ˜ Pb : R+ → [0,1] by:




t−i ∈ SN−1 : b(tj) <c ,j6= i
ª
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By the deﬁnition of S, ˜ Pb is strictly increasing and its image is the whole interval [0,1].
Now, we will denote by Pb : S → [0,1] the composition Pb = ˜ Pb ◦ b.S o ,f o ra ﬁxed b ∈ S,
followed by all players, Pb (ti) is the probability of player i of type ti wins the auction:
Pb (ti)=P r
©





t−i ∈ SN−1 : b(tj) 6 b(ti),∀j 6= i
ª
.
The following observation is important: from the symmetry required by (H0), the above function
does not depend on i and Pb (ti) S Pb (tj)i fa n do n l yi fb(ti) S b(tj). Obviously, two players
have the same probability of winning if and only if they play the same bids. So, we have the
following:
©




t−i ∈ SN−1 : Pb




(−i) (t−i) ≡ maxj6=i Pb (tj). The equality of these events and (2) imply that
Pb (ti)=P r
n
t−i ∈ SN−1 : Pb
(−i) (t−i) <Pb (ti)
o
.
This observation will allow us to deﬁne conjugations without mentioning bidding functions. This
will be very important in order to state our results. We have the following:
Deﬁnition 2. A conjugation for the auction (S,µ,v) is a measurable and surjective function
P : S → [0,1] such that for each i =1 ,. . .N,
(3) P(ti)=P r {t−i ∈ SN−1 : P(−i) (t−i) 6 P (ti)} =[ P r {tj ∈ S : P (tj) <P(ti),j6= i}]
N−1 .
O b s e r v et h a ti nt h ea b o v ed e ﬁnition, we do not need to mention the strategy b ∈ S.I t i s
also clear from the previous discussion that deﬁnition 2 is not empty, that is, for any regular
function b ∈ S there exists a conjugation deﬁned by (2) that satisﬁes the above deﬁnition.
Observe also that, since the range of P is [0,1], we have, for all c ∈ [0,1],
(4) Pr
©
t−i ∈ SN−1 : P(−i) (t−i) <c
ª
= c.
The above equation will be important in the sequel. It simply means that the distribution of
P(−i) (t−i) is uniform on [0,1].
Given b ∈ S, equation (2) deﬁnes just one conjugation compatible with it. On the other
hand, given a conjugation P, any function b ∈ S that is an increasing transformation of P is
compatible with P. To see this, suppose that there is an increasing function h :[ 0 ,1] → R+,
such that b(ti)=h(P (ti)) for µ−almost all ti ∈ S. Then,
P (ti)=P r {t−i : P (tj) <P(ti),∀j 6= i}
=P r {t−i : h(P (tj)) <h(P (ti)),∀j 6= i}
=P r {t−i : b(tj) <b(ti),∀j 6= i}.
That is, given a conjugation P, there are many functions b ∈ S compatible with it. In particular,
b = P is a bidding function compatible with P.NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 7
3.2. Indirect Auctions. We proceed to deﬁne the indirect auction
³
˜ S,˜ µ, ˜ v
´
related to the
direct auction (S,µ,v). The relation between them is given by the conjugation P : S → [0,1].
If the direct type of a player is ti ∈ S, the indirect type will be P (ti). So, ˜ S is just [0,1]. Each
direct strategy b : S → R corresponds to an indirect strategy ˜ b :[ 0 ,1] → R, such that the direct
strategy will be the composition of the indirect strategy and the conjugation, that is, b = ˜ b◦P,
where P = Pb. What is this indirect strategy? Remember that Pb = ˜ Pb◦b and ˜ Pb is increasing.




,t h e nb = ˜ b ◦ P,a sw ew a n t . O n
the other hand, if it is given an indirect strategy ˜ b and a conjugation P,w eh a v et h ea s s o c i a t e d
direct strategy b = ˜ b ◦ P.S ow eh a v ej u s tt od e ﬁne the indirect payoﬀs:
Deﬁnition 3. Fix a conjugation P for an auction (S,µ,v). The indirect utility function of
bidder i associated to this conjugation is ˜ v :[ 0 ,1]
2 → R,g i v e nb y
(5) ˜ v(x,y) ≡ E[v(ti,t −i)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=y].
Now, ﬁx a conjugation P and deﬁne the following function:
(6) ˜ Π(x,c) ≡ E [Π(ti,c)|P (ti)=x],
where, Π(ti,c) is the interim payoﬀ of the direct auction. The notation should suggest to the
reader that ˜ Π(x,c) will be the interim payoﬀ of the indirect auction. Indeed, we have the
following:
Proposition 1. Assume (H0). Given b ∈ S, consider the corresponding conjugation P = Pb




. Alternatively, given a conjugation



















(ii) Assume that P is such that for all s with P (s)=x,a n df o ra l lx,y ∈ [0,1],
(8) ˜ v(x,y)=E[v(t)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=y]=E[v(t)|ti = s,P(−i)(t−i)=y].
Then, for all ti such that P (ti)=x and for all c ∈ B,
(9) ˜ Π(x,c)=Π(ti,c).
Proof. See Appendix A.¥
Observe that, because of (7), ˜ Π(x,c) is formally equivalent to the interim payoﬀ of an auction
between two bidders, with signals uniformly distributed on [0,1], where the opponent is following
the strategy ˜ b(·) and the (common-value) utility function is given by ˜ v(x,α). So, we deﬁne the
indirect auction as follows:8 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
Deﬁnition 4. Given an auction (S,µ,v) and a conjugation P for it, the associated indirect
auction is an auction between two players with independent types uniformly distributed on [0,1]
and where the utility function is ˜ v deﬁned by (5). The indirect auction is denoted by
³
˜ S,˜ µ, ˜ v
´
where ˜ µ is the Lebesgue measure in ˜ S =[ 0 ,1].
The reader should keep in mind that the indirect auction is just an auxiliary and ﬁctitious
auction that will help in the analysis of the “direct” one. It is clear through deﬁnitions 1-4 how
a conjugation relates the direct and the indirect auction. Obviously, a function ˜ b :[ 0 ,1] → R+




> ˜ Π(x,c), ∀c ∈
B = {bOUT} ∪ [bmin,+∞).
4. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Regular Equilibria
The results and deﬁnitions of the two previous subsections allow us to show that the existence
of a direct equilibrium implies the existence of the indirect one (Theorem 1, below). Conversely,
(with an extra relatively weak assumption of consistency of payoﬀs) the existence of equilibrium
in indirect auctions implies the existence in direct ones (Theorem 2).
Theorem 1 (Necessary Conditions). Assume (H0)-(H2). If there is a pure strategy equilib-
rium b ∈ S for the direct auction (S,µ,v) and there exists ∂bΠ(s,b(s)) for all s, then:
(i) the associated conjugation P = Pb (given by (2)) satisﬁes the following property: if s ∈ S
is such that P (s)=x,t h e n 6
(10) ˜ v(x,x)=E[v(ti,t −i)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=x]=E[v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,P(−i)(t−i)=x];




,w h e r e˜ Pb is given by (1), is the increasing
equilibrium of the indirect auction.
Moreover, if ˜ v is continuous (i.e., if it has a continuous representative), then:
(iii) (H1)-1 implies that ˜ b is diﬀerentiable and
(11) ˜ b0 (x)=




















and (H1)-2 implies that














6This condition is related to an analogous one derived by Araujo and Moreira (2000) for the screening problem
and Araujo and Moreira (2001) for signaling model. In these papers, the violation of the single crossing property
leads to non-monotonicity.NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 9




[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα > 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.¥
Theorem 1 says that if a multidimensional auction has a regular equilibrium, then it can be
reduced to a unidimensional auction with two players (the indirect one). However, the reader
should note that such reduction is non-trivial and that the indirect auction is not equivalent
to the direct one. The indirect auction is a “ﬁctitious” game, where each bidder is facing up a
“ﬁctitious” player, the “opponent”, that does not correspond to a real player. So, the dimension
reduction is meant in this particular sense.
The expression in condition (iv) does not depend on the speciﬁc format of the payment rules,
pW and pL, but it does depend on the conjugation. For the class of auctions considered in the
next section, we are able to prove that the conjugation is unique and the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem holds. On the other hand, condition (iv) plays an important role to prove the existence
of equilibrium in the next result.
Theorem 2 is a kind of converse of Theorem 1. The main diﬀerence is that we do not require
˜ v to be continuous and we need condition (i)’, which is slightly stronger than condition (i) in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Suﬃcient Conditions). Assume (H0)-(H2). Consider a direct auction (S,µ,v),
a conjugation P and its associated indirect auction
³
˜ S,˜ µ, ˜ v
´
. Assume that
(i)’ for all s ∈ S such that P (s)=x,a n da l ly ∈ [0,1],
(14) ˜ v(x,y)=E[v(ti,t −i)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=y]=E[v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,P(−i)(t−i)=y];
(ii) for all x and y ∈ [0,1],
Z x
y
[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα > 0;



















where ˆ p(P (ti)) = p(ti) is the expected payment of a bidder of type ti.
Then, ˜ b is the equilibrium of the indirect auction and b = ˜ b◦P is the equilibrium of the direct
auction. Moreover, if ˜ v is continuous, there exists ∂bΠ(s,b(s)) for all s (which implies that all
conditions of Theorem 1 are satisﬁed).
Proof. See Appendix C.¥
Remark 1. For the four speciﬁc formats, namely, the ﬁrst-price auction (F), second-price
auction (S), all-pay auction (A) and war of attrition (W), the function ˜ b is given, respectively,


















Conditions (iii) and (iv) reduce to the requirement that the function ˜ b above is increasing. In
particular, the equilibrium may exist for an all-pay auction, for instance, but not for a ﬁrst-price
auction.
Remark 2. Although natural, condition (i)’ can be still too restrictive. We need it in order
to apply Proposition 1 and reach the conclusion that for all ti such that P (ti)=x and for all
c ∈ R,w eh a v e : ˜ Π(x,c)=Π(ti,c) (see (9) in Proposition 1). In turn, this implies that the
equilibrium of the indirect auction is equilibrium of the direct auction. So, instead of assuming
condition (i)’ above, it would be suﬃcient to require the (necessary) condition (i) of Theorem 1
and that (9) is valid. For instance, when v(ti,t −i)i sg i v e nb y
PK
k=1 fk (ti)gk (t−i), condition (i)
is suﬃcient to have (9) and Theorem 2 is valid with the (necessary) condition (i) in the place of
the condition (i)’.7
Theorem 2 reduces the problem of equilibrium existence to ﬁnd a conjugation that meets
requirements (i)’, (ii) and (iii). In the next section we treat a still general case (weakly separable
auctions) where such conjugation can be easily deﬁned. Nevertheless, we would like to give two
examples where the assumptions of the next section are not satisﬁed. These examples illustrate
a kind of heuristics for the existence problem. I ne x a m p l e1 ,w eh a v eam o n o t o n i ce q u i l i b r i u m
and also a U-shaped one, which shows that the conjugation is not unique. In example 2, there
is no monotonic equilibrium, but there is a bell-shaped equilibrium. Another example where
Theorem 2 can be applied is an example provided by Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu and
Zame (2004).
Example 1 – Consider a symmetric ﬁrst-price auction with two bidders, types uniformly
distributed on [0,1] and utility function given by
v(ti,t −i)=ti +
¡




Observe that ∂tiv(ti,t −i)=1 −4t−i+4tit−i can be negative. Thus, the received theory cannot be
applied. Nevertheless, there exists a monotonic equilibrium. Indeed, in this case, the conjugation
will be given by P (ti)=ti and we obtain
˜ v(x,y)=x +
¡
3 − 4x +2 x2¢
y.
˜ v clearly satisﬁes condition (i)’. Condition (ii) follows from the fact that x>yimplies
7See also an extension of Example 1 in the Appendix D, which exempliﬁe st h em e t h o di nt h i sc a s e .NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 11
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Figure 1. Equilibrium bidding function in Example 1.
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24 − 16x +3 x2¢
12
is increasing. Clearly, the above function satisﬁes condition (iv). Thus, there exists a monotonic
equilibrium by Theorem 2.
Nevertheless, this is not the unique equilibrium. If we assume that there exists a U-shaped
equilibrium, the conjugation can be expressed by P (ti)=|c(ti) − ti|,w h e r ec(ti)i st h et y p e








3 − 4c(s)+2 c(s)
2








which simpliﬁes to [s + c(s)][2 − s − c(s)] = 1 ⇒ s + c(s)=1 . T h e n ,c(s)=1− s and

















is increasing. Then, b(s)=5
4 +
(1−2s)2
12 is a direct equilibrium, plotted in Figure 1.12 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA







Figure 2. Equilibrium bidding function in Example 2.
Observe that no tie rules are needed in this case, because ties occur with zero probability.
However, for each equilibrium bid, exactly two types pool and have the same probability of
winning.
In Appendix D, we treat a slightly more general case, where the conjugation is more diﬃcult
to ﬁnd than in this example.¥
Example 2 – Consider again a symmetric ﬁrst-price auction with two bidders and sig-






. In Appendix D, we show that this auction does not have monotonic regular equi-
libria, but there is a bell-shaped equilibrium as shown in Figure 2.¥
Example 1 shows that it is possible for a standard auction to have multiple equilibria. Example
2 suggests that the correct conjugation can fail to exist – at least with a ﬁxed shape (that we
began assuming). Thus, one would be interestedi nc a s e sw h e r ei ti sp o s s i b l et oe n s u r et h e
uniqueness of the equilibrium and where it is possible to ﬁnd explicitly the conjugation. We do
this under the context of assumption H3, to be presented in the next subsection.
5. Equilibrium Existence of Weakly Separable Auctions
Theorem 2 teaches us that the question of equilibrium existence is solved if we are able to ﬁnd
the proper conjugation. In examples 1 and 2 of the previous section we have shown situations
where the conjugations could be obtained. However, there we assumed some features of the
conjugation that are not necessary and we were able to ﬁnd the correct conjugation for those
settings. Now we will work in a setting where a conjugation always exists: the weakly separable
auctions. These are the auctions satisfying the following assumption:
(H3) (Weak Separability). v(ti,t −i) is such that if v(ti,t −i) <v(t0













−i.M o r e o v e r ,i fC ⊂ R has zero Lebesgue measure, then µ{s ∈ S :NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 13
v1 (s) ∈ C} =0 ,w h e r e
v1 (s) ≡ E [v(ti,t −i)|ti = s]
is the expected value of the object for bidder with type s.
Assumption (H3) is restrictive, but it is valid in many economic meaningful cases.8 Of course,
private values are included in (H3).
Under (H3), we can deﬁne explicitly the conjugation:
(19) P (ti) ≡ Pr
©
t−i ∈ SN−1 : v1 (tj) <v 1 (ti),j6= i
ª
.
Moreover, we can give a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium existence of
the direct auction: merely that the solution ˜ b to the ﬁrst-order condition of the indirect auction
be increasing. This is the content of the following:
Theorem 3 (Necessary and Suﬃcient Condition For Equilibrium Existence).A s s u m e( H 0 ) -
(H3). Let P be deﬁn e db y( 1 9 )a n dl e t˜ v be given by (5) for this P. There exists an equilibrium



















If this is the case, the equilibrium of the direct auction is given by b = ˜ b ◦ P and the expected





Additionally, if ˜ v is continuous, then there exists an equilibrium b ∈ S and there exists ∂bΠ(s,b(s))
for all s if and only if there exists an increasing function ˜ b that satisﬁes the following:
• For (H1)-1, ˜ b is diﬀerentiable and
˜ b0 (x)=



























• For (H1)-2, ˜ b is continuous and satisﬁes, for all x ∈ (0,1),









Moreover, if there is a unique ˜ b that satisﬁes such properties, the equilibrium of the direct
auction in regular pure strategies is also unique.
Proof. See Appendix C.¥







,w h e r eh is an increasing function. In this case, (H3) would also imply that u
1 (ti)d o e s
not assume a value with positive probability.14 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
Remark 3. As explained in Remark 1, if a multidimensional auction has a regular equilib-
rium, it can always be reduced (in a non-trivial way) to a one dimension auction (the indirect
auction). So, for obtaining equilibrium existence, we have to consider auctions that can be
“reduced”. This is what assumption H3 allows us to explicitly do. It still encompasses cases
where such reduction is not trivial, as we show in examples 3 and 4 below. The reduction of the
dimension of types is not a novelty in auction theory. While studying the eﬃciency of auctions,
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) use a condition close to H3 and Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti
(1996) made such reduction for revenue maximization. Nevertheless, to show equilibrium exis-
tence in auctions, one cannot use only H3 or the Dasgupta and Maskin’s condition, since the
received theory would require the monotonicity assumption of ˜ v on the reparameterized types.
As we show in examples 4 and 5, this is not always possible. So, an important feature of Theorem
3i st h a ti td o e sn o tr e q u i r e˜ v to be monotonic.
Example 3 (Spectrum Auction).9
Consider a ﬁrst-price auction of a spectrum license. The license covers two periods of time:
(1) In the ﬁrst period, the regulator lets the winner explore its monopoly power. Let t1
i be the
estimative of bidder i of the monopolist surplus in this ﬁrst period. Of course, the true surplus
will be better approximated by
¡
t1
1 + ... + t1
N
¢
/ N. If the bidder i (a ﬁrm) wins the auction, it
has to invest t2
i, a privately known amount, to build the network that will support the service.
So, in the ﬁrst period, the license gives to the ﬁrm
t1





(2) In the second period, the regulator makes an estimate of the operational costs of the
ﬁrm. The regulator cannot observe the true operational cost, t3
i, which is a private information
of the ﬁrm. Nevertheless, the regulator has a proxy that is a suﬃcient statistic for the mean
operational cost of all participants in the auction,
¡
t3
1 + ... + t3
N
¢
/ N.T h e r e g u l a t o r w i l l ﬁxa
price that will give zero proﬁtf o raﬁrm with the mean operational costs.10 So, in the second
period, the license gives to the winner
t3





So, the value of the object is given by
v(ti,t −i)=
t1


















, i =1 ,. . . ,N, be independent. Observe that the problem cannot




i(1/N − 1), we lose the information about t1
i and t3
i that are needed for the
value function of bidders j 6= i. Also, the model cannot be reparameterized to an increasing one.
If we try to put −t3
i in the place of t3
i, then the dependence of v(ti,t −i) on the signals t3
j will be
decreasing. So, the received theory does not ensure the existence of pure strategy equilibrium
for this case. Nevertheless, assumption (H3) is trivially satisﬁed. In Appendix D, we assume
9This example is more complex, but formally similar to example 5 of Dasgupta and Makin (2000).
10We assume that the regulator is institutionally constrained to follow such a procedure, so the optimality of






















− s2 − s3N − 1
N
− 1 > 0.
The derivation in Appendix D indeed provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the exis-
tence of equilibrium.¥
Example 4 (Job Market).
We model the job market for a manager as an auction among competing ﬁrms, where the
object is the job contract. It is natural to assume that the manager has a multidimensional vector
of characteristics, m =( m1,. . . ,m k). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that ﬁrms learn such
characteristics through interviews and curriculum analysis. Each ﬁrm also has a position to be
ﬁlled by the manager, with speciﬁc requirements for each dimension of the characteristics. For
instance, if dimension 1 is ability to communicate and the position is to be the manager of a
production section, there is level of desirability of this ability. An overly communicative person
may not be good. The same goes for the other characteristics. A bank may desire a suﬃciently
(but not exaggeratedly) high level of risk loving or audacity on the part of the manager, while
a family business may desire a much lower level. Even eﬃciency or qualiﬁcation can have a
level of desirability. Sometimes, the rejection of a candidate is explained by over-qualiﬁcation.
Therefore, let ti =( t1
i,. . . ,t K
i ) be the value of the characteristics desired by the ﬁrm.
Since ﬁrms are competitors, then if one hires the employee, the other will remain with a
vacant position, at least for a time.11 In this way, the winning ﬁrm also beneﬁts from the fact
that its competitors have a vacant position – and, then, are not operating perfectly well. The




















where ak is the level of importance of characteristic k of the manager, bk > 0r e p r e s e n t sh o w
important is the distance from the desired level tk
i of the characteristic k,a n dck is the weight




the ability k. As in the previous example, we cannot simplify this model to a unidimensional
monotonic model. In Appendix D we analyze the case where there is just one dimension (K =1 ) ,
2p l a y e r s( N = 2) and types are uniformly distributed on [0,1], b = b1 > 0. We show that when
11This model works only for non-competitive job markets. In other words, the buyers (the contracting ﬁrms)
have no access to a market with many homogenous employees to hire. This is implicit when we model it as an
auction. So, this is the reason why a ﬁrm that does not contract the manager suﬀers – it is not possible to ﬁnd
a suitable substitute instantaneously.
12If ﬁrms act in a oligopolistic market, it is possible to justify such externality through the fact that the vacant
position inﬂuences the quality of the product delivered by the ﬁrms and, hence, the equilibrium in this market.16 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA












Figure 3. Equilibrium bidding function in Example 4.
m1 = m>1/2, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in regular strategies if and only if


















Observe that for both cases the value c = 0 ensures the existence of equilibrium. This is expected,
since it corresponds to a private value auction. For a = b =1 /5,c=1 /20 and m =1 /3, the
equilibrium bidding function is shown in Figure 3.¥
Now, we can return to the example given in the introduction. Theorem 3 gives the conditions
for the equilibrium existence.
Example 5 (JSSZ, example 1). Let us consider a ﬁrst price auction with two bidders,
independent types uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Let v1 (ti)=ti and v2 (t−i)=α + βt−i.I ti s


















which is increasing only if β > −1 .O b s e r v et h a tf o r˜ b(·) > 0, it is necessary α > −(1 + β)x/2,
otherwise negative bids have to be allowed.¥
The example above is used by JSSZ to show that equilibrium may fail to exist under the
standard tie-breaking rule. They then provide a general existence result based on endogenous
tie-breaking rules. Nevertheless, their result has some undesirable properties. First, it is in
mixed strategies. Second, the tie-breaking rule is endogenous, so it is not possible to know what
rule has to be applied in order to guarantee the existence. Third, the rule requires that the
players announce their types, which is theoretically convenient but unfeasible in the real world.NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 17
Instead, consider the following rule: if a tie occurs, conduct an all-pay auction among the
tying bidders. If another tie occurs, split randomly the object.13,14
We show now that the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule ensures the existence of equilibrium
for all auctions that we are considering.
Theorem 4 (General Existence). Assume (H0) - (H3) and that the all-pay auction tie-


















then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C.¥
Remark 4. The main ingredients in the proof of Theorem 4 are the payment expression and
the fact the bidding function of an all-pay auction is always increasing. This is so because in





is exactly the expect payment, which implies (20). Since v is positive by (H0), ˜ v is positive
which implies that ˜ b is increasing. Thus, an auction that has an increasing ˜ b,a st h ew a ro f
attrition, can be also used as the tie-breaking mechanism.
Example 5 (cont.) With the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule, the equilibrium of Example 5












for the tie-breaking (all-pay) auction.¥
Remark 5.W h e n ˜ b is not increasing, there are types that are not ordered correctly (as in
Example 5). This can be understood as a failure of ˜ b in correctly revealing the information that
each bidder possesses. One can say that the tie-breaking rule has exactly the role of revealing
information, in this sense. Thus, Theorem 4 can be interpreted as saying that all-pay auctions
and war of attrition are better mechanisms for revelating information than ﬁrst-price and second-
price autions. This can be another way of justifying the use of research tournaments in practice.15
Indeed, the characteristics needed to compete for a research is very intricated: it is needed
13Observe that in the tie-breaking auction, bids and payments may be less than in the ﬁrst auction.
14Maskin and Riley (2000) used a similar tie-breaking rule. They propose to conduct a second price (Vickrey)
a u c t i o ni nt h ec a s eo fat i e .
15Research tournaments are theoretically modeled as all-pay auctions or war of attrition.18 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
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x0 x1  y0  y1 
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z0 
Figure 4. Possible speciﬁcations for the level of the tie.
information not only on the technical capabilities, but also on discipline, honesty, creativity, etc.
This (multidimensional) information is better revealed through an all-pay auction.16,17
The reader should note that Theorem 4 does not claim the uniqueness of equilibrium. Indeed,
if ˜ b is not increasing, there are many equilibria. There are two sources for this multiplicity.
The ﬁrst source is that under the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule, any level of the bid in the
range where ˜ b is not increasing can be chosen to be the level of the tie. This is shown in the
Figure 4. For instance, any a0 can be chosen between x0 and x1. Once one of the three elements
ak, bk or ck is determined, so are the other two. However, these possibilities lead to the same
expected payment and payoﬀ for each bidder in the auction.
Another point is that the tie-breaking rule is not unique, in general. It can be shown, for
instance, that for cases where˜ b is decreasing (as in example 1 of JSSZ) and for some speciﬁcations
of v, there is a continuum of tie-breaking rules (like that deﬁned by JSSZ for their example
1), which ensures the existence of equilibrium. All these tie-breaking rules nevertheless imply
diﬀerent revenues. In light of this observation, the existence of equilibrium with an endogenous
tie-breaking rule seems even more problematic as a solution concept, since it can sustain many
diﬀerent behaviors and payoﬀs at equilibrium.
This multiplicity is in contrast with the “ironing principle” usual in Contract Theory.18 The
unicity of the solution through the ironing principle comes from a Lagrangian condition that
must be satisﬁed by the contract. Here, we do not have the maximization function of the
principal. So, there is no additional condition that would ﬁx the level of tieing bids.
16Standard explanations for the use of tournaments in research also appeals to the role of information. See,
for instance, Taylor (1995, p. 872): “Contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are
unobservable and research outcomes cannot be veriﬁed by a court”. Our point is somewhat diﬀerent, but obviously
related to this explanation. The comparison among the information revealed by diﬀerent auctions is the novelty.
17Obviously, these observations are valid only under the context of assumptions (H0)-(H3). It is a matter for
future research to determine the range of validity of the existence ensured by all-pay auction tie-breaking rule.
18See, for instance, Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984).NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 19
The reader may observe that the expression of the payment in Theorem 3 depends only on
the conjugation, which is ﬁxed for all kind of auctions. Also, the payment is exactly the same
under the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule. So, we have the following:
Theorem 5 (Revenue Equivalence Theorem). Consider auctions that satisfy (H0) -(H3) and
with the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule. Then, any format of the auction gives the same
revenue, provided that bidders follow the symmetric equilibrium speciﬁed by Theorem 4.
Proof. See Appendix C.¥
6. Conclusion
Now we will brieﬂy highlight what are the most important contributions of this paper and
discuss possible extensions.
6.1. The Contributions. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Equilibrium Existence in the Multidimensional Setting – McAdams (2003a) generalizes
Athey (2001) for multidimensional types and actions. He works with discrete bids and
continuous types. Our approach gives the existence with continuum types and bids.
Our result provides the expressions of the bidding functions, while his is an existence
result only. His assumptions require monotonicity and are not on the fundamentals
of the model. On the other hand, our results do not cover multi-unit auctions nor
asymmetries as his. JSSZ give the existence for multidimensional games, including cases
with dependence, while we require independence. However, they need an endogenous
tie-breaking rule, and the existence is in mixed strategies, while our results are in pure
strategies. Jackson and Swinkels (2004) show the existence of equilibria for a large class
of multidimensional private value auctions. Their setting is private values, while ours is
interdependent values. They allow asymmetries, dependence of signals and multi-units,
but the existence is given in mixed strategies.
• Equilibrium Existence in Non-Monotonic Settings – We are not aware of any general
non-monotonic equilibrium existence results in pure strategies. Zheng (2001), Athey and
Levin (2001) and Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003) present cases where non-monotonicity
arises.
Thus, our method develops a theory to deal with the situations where the usual monotonic-
ity is not fulﬁlled.19 Araujo and Moreira (2000) use a similar method for the screening
problem without the single crossing property and Araujo and Moreira (2001) extend it
to signaling model.
• Uniqueness of Equilibrium – We are able to ensure the uniqueness of equilibrium in the
symmetric interdependent values auctions that satisfy assumption H3, extending the
well known uniqueness of unidimensional and monotonic auctions.
19Of course, papers that provide existence in distributional( m i x e d )s t r a t e g i e sc a nt r e at non-monotonic settings
as well.20 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
• Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for the Existence of Equilibrium without Ties –
The results of JSSZ do not allow one to distinguish when special tie-breaking is needed
or when it is not. Our approach clariﬁes, under assumption H3, whether ties occur with
positive probability (and there is a potential need for special tie-breaking rules).
• All-Pay Auction Tie-Breaking Rule – When there is a need for a tie with positive
probability, we are able to oﬀer an exogenous tie-breaking rule, which is implemented
through an all-pay auction. Moreover, the equilibrium that the rule implements is in
pure strategies. For private value auctions, Jackson and Swinkels (2004) show that the
equilibrium is invariant for any trade-maximizing tie-breaking rule. Nevertheless, this
does not need to hold for the interdependent values auctions that we treat here.
• Information Revelation – In the sense made precise by Remark 5, we show that all-pay
auction and war of attrition are better mechanisms to reveal information than ﬁrst-price
and second-price auctions.
• Revenue Equivalence Theorem – We have also generalized the Revenue Equivalence
Theorem (Theorem 5). Furthermore, Theorem 2 and Appendix B show that there is
a deep connection between the revenue equivalence and the existence of equilibrium.
Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Myerson (1981) establish that revenue equivalence is a
consequence of the equilibrium behavior. Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 in Appendix B
show that the revenue equivalence is also suﬃcient for the existence of equilibrium (if an
extra condition is satisﬁed).
Thus, our results have clariﬁed some aspects of the equilibrium existence problem in auctions.
The theory shows that, under assumption H3, there is no additional diﬃcult in working with
the more general setting of multidimensional types and non-monotonic utilities besides those
diﬃculties already present in the unidimensional setting.20 Moreover, this approach allows the
equilibrium bidding functions to be expressed in a simple manner. This is so because the
equilibrium bidding function of a general auction can be expressed by the equilibrium bidding
function of an auction with two bidders and types uniformly distributed on [0,1].
6.2. Limitations of the Method. Our theory makes two important assumptions: indepen-
dence of the types and symmetry.
The generalization of this approach for dependent types involves some diﬃculties, because the
conjugation would depend in a complicated way on types. Nevertheless, we believe that some
extension can be done if we assume conditional independence.21 It is worth remembering that
the problem with dependence is not speciﬁc to our approach. Jackson (1999) gives a counter-
example for the equilibrium existence of an auction with bidimensional aﬃliated types. Fang
and Morris (2003) also obtain negative results, not only for the existence of equilibrium but also
for the revenue equivalence.
On the other hand, asymmetry does not seem to impose severe restriction on the existence of
equilibrium. We believe that the approach of the indirect auction can be adapted to this case,
20Theorem 3 shows that the non-existence of the equilibrium comes from the non-monotonicity of the in-
direct bidding function. This can also occur in an unidimensional setting, although it can be more usual in
multidimensional models.
21de Castro (2004b) proposes the use of conditional independence as an alternative for aﬃliation.NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 21
although not in a straightforward way. If this can be done, it is unlikely that we will obtain
simple expressions as in this paper.
Another limitation of our theory is that it is applied only to single-unit auctions. The risk
neutrality does not seem to be a fundamental assumption, although complications can arise in
extending the approach for risk aversion.
Finally, the relaxation of assumption H3 is an obvious direction to pursue, although H3 seems
to encompass many important economical examples.
A p p e n d i xA-P r o o fo ft h eB a s i cR e s u l t s
We will need the following result, which was proved, in a more general setting, by de Castro
(2004a).
Lemma 1 (Payoﬀ Characterization) – Assume (H0)-(H2). Fix b(·) ∈ S. The bidder i’s
payoﬀ c a nb ee x p r e s s e db y















+ E[v(ti,t −i) − pW (β,β)+pL (β,β)|b(−i) (t−i)=β]fb(−i) (β).
a.e., where b(−i) (t−i) ≡ maxj6=i b(tj).
























Take a sequence an → b−
i ,i . e . ,an <b i (the other case is analogous). We want to prove that
there exists limn→∞ Dn (bi)/(bi − an) for almost all bi,w h e r e
Dn (bi)=Π(ti,b i,b(·)) − Π(ti,a n,b(·)).22 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
In the sequel, we will omit the measure
Q
j6=i µ(dtj) and the terms t−i.W eh a v e :
Dn (bi)=
Z £
















































L e tu sc a l lt h et h r e el a s ti n t e g r a l sa sD1
n (bi), D2
n (bi)a n dD3
n (bi), respectively. Since pW and






































































































dλ (.) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ρ with respect to λ. Indeed, the existence of
such limit is ensured by Theorem 8.6 of Rudin (1966) for almost all bi,t h a ti s ,
λ
µ½







It is easy to see that the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dρ
dλ (bi)i ss i m p l y
E[v(ti,t −i) − pW (β,β)+pL (β,β)|b(−i) (t−i)=β]fb(−i) (β),
where fb(−i) (β) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the distribution of maximum bids,
R
1[b(−i)(t−i)∈V].
Moreover, Theorem 8.6 of Rudin says that






Thus, (22), (23) and (24) imply that















+ E[v(ti,t −i) − pW (β,β)+pL (β,β)|max
j6=i
b(tj)=β]fb(−i) (β).
This concludes the proof.¥
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us introduce the following notation:
Π+ (ti,c)=
Z £

















Let us begin with the proof for ˜ Π+
i and Π+
i . Let us denote the conditional expectation by
(25) gti,c (α) ≡ E
h











occurs if and only if
h
˜ Pb (c) >Pb
(−i) (t−i)
i












Now we appeal to Lemma 2.2, p. 43, of Lehmann (1959). This lemma says the following: if R










g(α)µ∗ (dα).24 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
In our case, R = Pb





=P r {t−i ∈ SN−1 :




























where the second line comes from a interchange of integrals (Fubbini’s Theorem) and the last
line comes from independency and the deﬁnition of ˜ v(φi,α)a n dgti,c (α) (see (5) and (25)). Also




, we can substitute ˜ Pb to obtain









Now, we can repeat the above procedures with Π− (φi,c)a n do b t a i n :








Adding up, that is, putting ˜ Π(φi,c)=˜ Π+ (φi,c)− ˜ Π− (φi,c), we obtain the interim payoﬀ of
the indirect auction. This concludes the proof of the ﬁrst part.


















































where the last line comes from (26). Obviously, the same can be done for Π− and ˜ Π−.S o ,t h e
proof is complete.¥
Appendix B - Indirect Auction Equilibria
In this appendix, we will analyze auctions between two players, with independent types uni-
formly distributed on [0,1]. Since this is the setting of the indirect auction, we will use notation
consistent with that, although the results of this appendix are independent from the results of





˜ v(xi,x −i) − pW (bi,b −i), if bi >b −i
−pL (bi,b −i), if bi <b −i
˜ v(xi,x−i)−bi
2 , if bi = b−i
be the ex-post payoﬀ.W ew i l la s s u m e :
(H0)’ The types are independent and uniformly distributed on [0,1]. ˜ v is positive, measurable
and bounded above.
By the deﬁnition of the indirect auction, we are interested only in non-decreasing equilibria
˜ b, strictly increasing in the range of winning types. That is, for a non-decreasing strategy ˜ b,
deﬁne x0 to be the minimum type that bids at least bmin.S ow er e q u i r e ˜ b to be increasing in


















Indeed, the above integral is the payoﬀ of x0. If it is negative, then x0 can do better by bidding







dα which is non-positive because pL is positive. If x0 > 0, for a x<x 0
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is still positive (because of the continuity of ˜ v). So, x is receiving zero but could obtain a strictly
positive payoﬀ by bidding ˜ b(x0)=bmin.
So, for a ﬁxed ˜ b, we assume the following:
(H2)’ There exists x0, the mininum indirect type that satisﬁes (29) and x0 ∈ [0,1).
We have the following:
Proposition 2 (Case 1). Assume (H0)’, (H1)-1, that is, ∂1pW (·) > 0o r∂1pL (·) > 0, (H2)’
and that ˜ v is continuous. Let ˜ b be an increasing equilibrium of the indirect auction. Then, ˜ b is
diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes
(30) ˜ b0 (x)=




















Proof. The proof is an adaptation of part of the proof of Theorem 2 of Maskin and Riley
(1984).22 Suppose that player −i follows ˜ b.T h ei n t e r i mp a y o ﬀ of player i with (indirect) type
xi is
˜ Π(xi,b i,˜ b(·)) =
Z £






If ˜ b is discontinuous, there exists x∗ > x0,w i t h
lim sup
x<x∗









= liminfx>x∗ ˜ b(x)+ε and x−ε






=l i m s u p x<x∗ ˜ b(x) − ε. We will prove that, for ε > 0s u ﬃciently small, the bid β−ε
is better than β+ε for a bidder with type x+ε
i . This will be the contradiction. The event h
β+ε > ˜ b(x−i)
i
is arbitrarily close to
h
β−ε > ˜ b(x−i)
i
.S o ,t h ed i ﬀerence of expected utilities
Z
˜ v(x+ε
i ,x −i)1[β+ε>˜ b(x−i)]dx−i −
Z
˜ v(x+ε




i ,x −i)1[β+ε>˜ b(x−i)≥β−ε]dx−i
is arbitrarily small. On the other hand, the diﬀerence of expected payments is
















































−∂1pL (z,b(x−i))1[β−ε<˜ b(x−i)]dx−i + r
where r denotes the integrals over the event
h
β+ε > ˜ b(x−i) > β−ε
i
. Observe that the sum of
the two integrals is negative and bounded away from zero, because ∂1pW (·) > 0o r∂1pL (·) > 0.
So, it is not optimal for bidder x+ε
i to bid β+ε and this contradicts ˜ b to be an equilibrium. So,
˜ b is continuous. Let us prove that it is diﬀerentiable.
We have








































































Since the ﬁrst integrand is continuous, by the mean value theorem, there exists x∗ between x






















´i28 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
Since pW and pL are diﬀerentiable and ˜ b is continuously increasing, there exist xW and xL


























where j = W, L.S o ,s i n c e˜ Π(x,˜ b(x),˜ b(·)) − ˜ Π(x,˜ b(y),˜ b(·)) > 0, we have, for y>x ,
(31)
























Analogously, interchanging x and y, and using ˜ Π(y,˜ b(y),˜ b(·))− ˜ Π(y,˜ b(x),˜ b(·)) > 0, with y>x ,
we obtain, the existence of ˆ x,ˆ xW and ˆ xL in [x,y] such that
(32)




˜ v(y, ˆ x) − pW
³


















When x>y , we again obtain reverse inequalities. When we make y → x, the right hand side in
(31) and (32) both converge to




















So, ˜ b is diﬀerentiable at x ∈ (x0,1) and ˜ b0 (x) is equal to the expression above.¥
Proposition 3 (Case 2). Assume (H0)’, (H1)-2 and that ˜ v is continuous. Let ˜ b be an
increasing equilibrium of the indirect auction. Then,








=0 ,∀x ∈ (x0,1).
Proof. The proof is based on the proof of Theorem 3 of Maskin and Riley (1984). Given b,
b0, let us deﬁne the function h as




Since ∂1pW = ∂1pL ≡ 0a n d∂2
¡
pW − pL¢
> 0, h does not depend on b or b0 and is diﬀerentiable
and increasing.
By contradiction, assume that (33) is false, that is, there exists x∗ ∈ (x0,1) such that





Because ˜ v is continuous and ˜ b is increasing, for suﬃciently small δ > 0, we have






˜ b(x∗ − δ)
´
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Since the set of discontinuity points of ˜ b is enumerable, we may assume that (34) holds for a










Consider the following diﬀerence:





˜ v(x∗,α) − pW
³



































w h e r ew eu s e dt h ep r o p e r t y∂1pW = ∂1pL ≡ 0 in order to obtain the last equality. This
contradicts the optimality of ˜ b(x∗)f o rx∗.





that x∗ is a point of continuity of ˜ b,w eh a v ef o rε > 0s u ﬃciently small,










This completes the proof of (33). So, we have
(35) ˜ b(x)=h−1 (˜ v(x,x)),
which shows that ˜ b is continuous. Moreover, ˜ b is increasing if and only if x 7−→ ˜ v(x,x)i sa l s o
increasing.¥
Now, we will analyze the equilibrium existence in both cases 1 and 2. Instead of assuming that
˜ v is continuous, as we did in the last two propositions, we will assume directly its consequence,
that is, we suppose that there exists a function ˜ b that satisﬁes the following:
Case 1: ∂1pW (·) > 0o r∂1pL (·) > 0, ˜ b is diﬀerentiable and
˜ b0 (x)=




















Case 2: ∂1pW = ∂1pL =0 ,∂2
¡
pW − pL¢
> 0, ˜ b is continuous, and













Observe that we do not assume that ˜ b is increasing. This is so because this is exactly the
setting of Theorem 4. To treat non-increasing ˜ b,w ed e ﬁne the following:30 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
Modiﬁed Auction - The bidder submits a type y ∈ [0,1]. In any event, the payment is
determined as if the bidder has submitted the bid ˜ b(y). The bidder wins against opponents who
announce types below y and loses against opponents who announce types above y.I ft h e r ei sa
tie, the object is given with probability 1/2 for each bidder.
Observe that if ˜ b is increasing, the modiﬁed auction is simply the indirect auction. If ˜ b is
not increasing, the diﬀerence is that the winning events are not determined by ˜ b but by the















dα,i f y > x0
0i f y<x 0
We can simplify the above expression to
(36) ˆ Π(x,y)=
½R y
0 ˜ v(x,α)dα − ˆ p(y), ify > x0














dα, if y > x0
0, if y<x 0
In case 1, ˜ b, pW and pL are diﬀerentiable on (x0,1), ˆ p and ˆ Π are also diﬀerentiable. So, for every




˜ v(x,α)dα − ˆ Π(x,y)
¾
=˜ v(x,y) − ∂yˆ Π(x,y).
Truth-telling is always optimal if
(37) ˆ Π(x,x) − ˆ Π(x,y) > 0.
In case 1, this is equivalent to
Z x
y
∂yˆ Π(x,α)dα > 0
if x,y > x0. Also, if x,y > x0, ∂yˆ Π(x,y) |y=x must be zero, so that
(38) ∂yˆ Π(x,y) |y=x=0⇒ ˆ p0 (x)=˜ v(x,x).




˜ v(α,α)dα +ˆ p(x0).NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 31
Now, let us turn to case 2. Since ˜ b is only continuous, ˆ p is not necessarily diﬀerentiable.








































˜ v(α,α)dα +ˆ p(x0).
O b s e r v et h a tt h ee x p r e s s i o na b o v ei se x a c t l yt h es a m eo fc a s e1 .F o ry<x 0, the payment is


















S o ,w eh a v ep r o v e dt h ef o l l o w i n g :
Proposition 4 (Payment Rule). Assume (H0)’, (H1) and (H2)’. Then, both for case 1 or







x0 ˜ v(α,α)dα, if y>x 0 R x0
0 ˜ v(x0,α)dα, if y = x0
0, if y<x 0
Now, we turn to the equilibrium existence.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium). Assume (H0)’, (H1), (H2)’ and (39). Then, truth-telling is






y [˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα > 0, if x,y > x0 R x
x0 [˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα +
R x0
0 [˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(x0,α)]dα > 0, if x > x0 >y
0 >
R y
x0 [˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα +
R x0
0 [˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(x0,α)]dα if y > x0 >x


















[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα > 0 (41)
if x,y > x0. The other cases are immediate.¥32 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
As we have said before, if ˜ b is increasing, the modiﬁed auction is just the original (unmodiﬁed)
auction. Then, we have:
Corollary 1. Assume (H0)’, (H1), (H2)’ and that ˜ b is increasing and implies (39). Then, if
(40) holds, ˜ b is equilibrium of the indirect auction.
Observe that Corollary 1 does not require ˜ v to be continuous.
Appendix C - Proofs of the Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1.
(i) If b ∈ S,i td e ﬁnes a conjugation Pb by (2). The bid b(ti)=β is optimal for bidder ti
against the strategy b(·) of the opponents. This and the fact that ∂bΠ(s,b(s)) = 0 imply that
E
£
v(ti,·)|ti = s,b(−i) (t−i)=β
¤







Observe that the right-hand side does not depend on s (it depends on it only by the fact that
β = b(s) is the optimum bid for such bidder). Thus, the left-hand side has to be the same for
all s that are bidding the same bid in equilibrium, which implies that (10) holds.
(ii) If b(ti) maximizes Π(ti,c)f o rti,a n dP (t0
i)=P (ti), then b(t0
i)=b(ti). Then, b(ti)
maximizes ˜ Π(P (t0
i),c) for all t0
i such that P (t0
i)=P (ti), from the deﬁnition of ˜ Π(P (ti),c)








is the equilibrium of the indirect
auction.
If ˜ v is continuous, we appeal to the results of Appendix B. Propositions 2 and 3 prove (iii),
Proposition 4 proves (iv) and Proposition 5 gives (v).¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . Corollary 1 of Appendix B proves that conditions (ii) and (iii) are
suﬃcient for ˜ b to be the equilibrium of the indirect auction. Now, Proposition 1 proves that
condition (i)’ implies that for all s such that P (s)=x, ˜ Π(x,c)=Π(s,c) (see (9)). Now, if we
put b(s)=˜ b(P (s)), then
Π(s,b(s)) = ˜ Π
³




B u tt h i si ss u ﬃcient to show the equilibrium existence in the direct auction, since ˜ b is the
equilibrium in the indirect auction, which implies that
˜ Π
³
P (s),˜ b(P (s))
´
> ˜ Π(P (s),c),
for all c ∈ R.I f˜ v is continuous, ˜ Π(x,c)i sd i ﬀerentiable at all c ∈ R. This concludes the proof.¥NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 33
Through the proof of Theorem 3, we will make successive use of the following fact:













v(ti,t −i)|ti = s0,Σ
¤
>E[v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,Σ], a.s.
Proof. (H3) gives the ﬁrst equivalence. By (H2), v is continuous over a compact. So, if ∀t−i :
v(s0,t −i) >v(s,t−i), there is δ > 0s ot h a td(t−i) ≡ v(s0,t −i) − v(s,t−i) − δ > 0 for all t−i.
Then, for any Σ, E [d(t−i)|Σ] > 0a l m o s ts u r e l y . 23 This implies that E[v(ti,t −i)| ti = s0,Σ] >
E[v(ti,t −i)| ti = s,Σ], a.s. On the other hand, E[v(ti,t −i)| ti = s0,Σ] >E [v(ti,t −i)|
ti = s,Σ] a.s. implies that ∃t−i : v(s0,t −i) >v(s,t−i).¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 .Equilibrium Existence. If we deﬁne P by (19), it is a conjugation. Let
us prove that it satisﬁes condition (i)’ of Theorem 2. If for some x, y and s, such that P (s)=x,
we have
˜ v(x,y)=E[v(ti,t −i)|P(ti)=x,P(−i)(t−i)=y] <E [v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,P(−1)(t−i)=y],
then, for at least one t−i and s0, P (s0)=x, v(s,t−i) >v(s0,t −i). But then, by (H3), v(s,t−i) >
v(s0,t −i)f o ra l lt−i which implies v1 (s) >v 1 (s0)a n dP (s) >P(s0), a contradiction with the
assumption that P (s)=P (s0)=x. So, condition (i)0 is satisﬁed.
Let us prove condition (ii) of Theorem 2. If x>y , for all ti and t0
i such that P (t0
i)=x and
P (ti)=y,w eh a v ev(t0
i,t −i) >v(ti,t −i) for all t−i, by (H3). Then, for all z ∈ [0,1],
˜ v(x,z) ≡ E
£




v(ti,t −i)|P (ti)=y,P(−i) (t−i)=z
¤
=˜ v(y,z).
Then, if y<α <x ,˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α) > 0 and we have:
Z x
y
[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα > 0.
Now if x<α <y ,w eh a v e˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α) < 0 so that condition (ii) is satisﬁed. Since our
assumption is the condition (iii) of Theorem 2, this implies the existence of equilibrium, with
the equilibrium bidding function given by b = ˜ b ◦ P.
Suﬃciency. Conditions (i)’ and (ii) of the Theorem 2 was shown in the ﬁrst part, above.
Proposition 4 in appendix B proves condition (iii) of Theorem 2. Then, there exists a equilibrium
b = ˜ b ◦ P. Since ˜ v is continuous, Theorem 2 shows the existence of ∂bΠ(s,b(s)) for all s.
Necessity. According to Theorem 1, given a b ∈ S, the associated conjugation Pb (given by




(−i)(t−i)=x]=E[v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,Pb
(−i)(t−i)=x].
23See, for instance, Kallenberg (2002), Theorem 6.1, p. 104.34 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
If Pb (s)=Pb (s0) and there is some t−i such that v(s,t−i) <v(s0,t −i), Lemma 2 implies that
E[v(ti,t −i)|ti = s,Pb
(−i)(t−i)=x] <E [v(ti,t −i)|ti = s0,Pb
(−i)(t−i)=x],
which contradicts the previous equality between the conditional expectations. We conclude that











and prove that it is non-decreasing. Suppose by
absurd that there exist x and y, x>y , such that ˜ v1 (x) < ˜ v1 (y).
First, we claim that for all ti and t0
i such that Pb (ti)=x and Pb (t0
i)=y,w eh a v ev(ti,t −i) <
v(t0
i,t −i) for all t−i. Otherwise, v(ti,t −i) > v(t0






















=˜ v1 (y), a contradiction with our (absurd) assumption. Thus, the
claim is proved.
This claim and Lemma 2 imply that











for all z ∈ [0,1], a.s. Thus,
Z x
y
[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(y,α)]dα < 0.
By condition (v) of Theorem 1, we also have that
Z x
y
[˜ v(y,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα 6 0.
Summing up these two integrals, we obtain
Z x
y
[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα < 0,
which contradicts condition (v) of Theorem 1. This contradiction establishes that x>y⇒
˜ v1 (x) > ˜ v1 (y).
Suppose now that there exists x>ysuch that ˜ v1 (x)=˜ v1 (y). Then, the monotonicity of ˜ v1
(just proved) gives
(43) ∀φ ∈ [y,x], ˜ v1 (φ)=˜ v1 (x)=˜ v1 (y).
Let S0 =
n
s ∈ S : ˜ b(y) 6 b(s) < ˜ b(x)
o
. From (2), for all s ∈ S0, Pb (s) ∈ [y,x]. Then, (42) and
(43) imply that s ∈ S0 ⇒ v1 (s)=˜ v1 (x). Assumption (H3) requires that µ(S0)=0 . O b s e r v e
that S0 = A\B,w h e r eA ≡
n




s ∈ S : b(s) < ˜ b(y)
o
. But then,
µ(A)=µ(B). However, from the deﬁnition of ˜ b as the inverse of ˜ Pb,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g :


















Figure 5. Indirect Equilibrium Bidding Function
which is a contradiction. So, we have proved that x = Pb (s0) >P b (s)=y implies v1 (s0)=
˜ v1 (x) > ˜ v1 (y)=v1 (s)a n dPb (s0)=Pb (s)i m p l i e sv1 (s0)=v1 (s). In other words, Pb (s0) S
Pb (s) if and only if v1 (s0) S v1 (s) which allows us to conclude that
Pb (ti)=P r
©
t−i ∈ T−i = SN−1 : v1 (tj) <v 1 (ti),j6= i
ª
,
as we have deﬁned in (19). In other words, the conjugation is unique.
Now, ˜ v and ˜ b in Theorem 1 are exactly those deﬁned in the statement of Theorem 3. So,
Theorem 1 implies the claims about ˜ b.
Uniqueness. Since ˜ v is continuous, Propositions 2 and 3 in Appendix B says that any equi-
librium ˜ b satisfy the conditions given. If there is just one ˜ b that satisfy such conditions, then
the equilibrium of the indirect auction is unique. Since the previous step (necessity) shows that
the conjugation is unique, the equilibrium of the direct auction is unique.¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 .I f ˜ b is strictly increasing, then b = ˜ b ◦ P is an equilibrium of direct
auction, by Theorem 3.
So, we have to show that an equilibrium exists if ˜ b is not increasing. For future use, remember
that in the ﬁrst part of the proof of Theorem 3, we have established conditions (i)’ and (ii) of
Theorem 2 and that
(44) x>y⇒ ˜ v(x,z) > ˜ v(y,z),∀z ∈ [0,1].
Let us deﬁne b(x)=s u p α∈[0,x]˜ b(α). As we discussed after the statement of Theorem 4, this is
just one of the possible speciﬁcation for the equilibrium bidding function. The only exception is
when the tie is to occur including the highest bidder. In such a case, it is mandatory to have the
bid of tying bidders following the above deﬁnition. The reason will become clear in the sequel.
Remember that ˜ b is absolutely continuous. Then, there is an enumerable set of intervals
[ak,c k]w h e r eb(x) is constant. Let bk ≡ b(x)f o rx ∈ [ak,c k]. (See Figure 5.)36 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
Therefore, there is a tie among the indirect types in [ak,c k] for the bidding function b.L e tbk
be the speciﬁed bid for indirect types in [ak,c k], that is, b([ak,c k]) = {bk}.T h et i ei ss o l v e db y
an all-pay auction among tying bidders.
The unique information that bidders have for the second auction is that there is a tie in bk,
that is, P(−i) (t−i) ∈ [ak,c k].
By the deﬁnition of P in (19), P(−i) satisﬁes the following:
Pr
¡©
t−i ∈ SN−1 : P(−i) (t−i) <x
ª






So, in the tie-breaking auction, the (direct) type ti of bidder i is competing against players tj



























for any x,y ∈ [ak,c k].
Thus, in the whole auction, the bidder of indirect type x ∈ [ak,c k] who follows the strategy
b(x) and, in case of a tie, the above strategy, will receive the expected payoﬀ
Z ak
0











[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα
Deviation in the second auction is suboptimal. By deviating from b, but bidding in the range








[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα,
if b(y) is not a bid with positive probability. This cannot be proﬁtable by condition (ii). If it
is a bid with positive probability, the second stage will be again an all-pay auction, where the
bidder cannot improve its payoﬀ, again by condition (ii).







because pL 6 0. Therefore, this deviation cannot be proﬁtable.
24It is increasing because ˜ v is positive.NON-MONOTONIC AUCTIONS 37








































[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα +
Z 1
x




[˜ v(x,α) − ˜ v(α,α)]dα,
where the last inequality comes from (44). Thus, the deviation to β is unproﬁtable.
In Theorem 3, we also proved condition (i)’. Then, the equilibrium in the indirect auction
gives the equilibrium for the direct one.¥



















If x ∈ [ak,c k], in the notation of the previous proof, the expected payment of x will be
Z ak
0












So, if the equilibrium speciﬁed in the proof of Theorem 4 is followed, the expected payment does
not depend on the auction format.¥
Appendix D - Proofs for the Examples
Generalization of Example 1.
As in Example 1, consider a symmetric auction with two bidders whose utility functions are
given by:
v(ti,t −i)=ti + α(ti)t−i
where α :[ 0 ,1] → R and ti is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. If there are only two pooling
types, that is, types which bid the same for each equilibrium bidding, then, for each i and t,t h e
respective pooling type of t, ϕ = ϕ(t), in a symmetric equilibrium (b∗,b ∗)s a t i s ﬁes the condition
(i) of Theorem 1:
t + α(t)E[t2|b∗(t)=b∗(t2)] = ϕ + α(ϕ)E[t2|b∗(t)=b∗(t2)].38 ALOISIO ARAUJO, LUCIANO I. DE CASTRO FILHO, AND HUMBERTO MOREIRA
Since E[t2|b∗(t)=b∗(t2)] = (t+ϕ)/2, because of the symmetry and the uniform distribution,
then ϕ is the implicit solution of
(t + ϕ)(α(ϕ) − α(t)) = 2(t − ϕ).
Claim. Assume the following conditions:
(i) α is diﬀerentiable, decreasing and convex such that α(0) − α(¯ v)=2 ;
(ii) α0 is strictly convex and α0(x) ≥− 1/x for all x ∈ (0,1];
Then there exists an U-shaped symmetric equilibrium.





It is easy to see that P is decreasing.
Deﬁne









Observe that v(t1,t 2)i so ft h ef o r m
P2
k=1 fk (ti)gk (t−i). Therefore, by Remark 2 and Theorem
2, the bidding function is an equilibrium if
x > y ⇒ e v(x,y) > e v(y,y).










For each w ∈ (0,1], deﬁne gw(z)= z
w + α(z), for z ∈ [w,1]. It is easy to see that g is non-
decreasing (because g0
w(z)= 1
w + α0(z) > 1
w − 1
z > 0). Let y and w =
y+ϕ(y)
2 be ﬁxed and take




















if x+ϕ(x) > y +ϕ(y). So, to show (45), it is enough to show that t+ϕ(t)i sn o n - i n c r e a s i n gi n
t or, equivalently, ϕ0(t) ≤− 1.
The implicit derivative of ϕ with respect to t is:
ϕ0 (t)=
α(t) − α(ϕ(t)) + (t + ϕ(t))α0(t)+2
α(ϕ(t)) − α(t)+( t + ϕ(t))α0(ϕ)+2
.
If ϕ0 (t) 6 −1, then the numerator and denominator of the fraction above should have opposite
sign. Without loss of generality (because ϕ ◦ ϕ(t)=t), we can assume that the denominator is
negative and ϕ >t .T h u s ,



















g(x)  f(x) 
x 
Figure 6. Equilibrium bidding function in Example 1.












where the equality comes from the implicit deﬁnition of ϕ. However, this last equality is true
because α0(x) ≥− 1/x for all x ∈ (0,1]. ¥
Proof of the claims in Example 2.
First, let us show that there is no monotonic equilibria for this auction. By contradiction,
assume that there is an increasing equilibrium bidding function. Then, P (ti)=ti−1.5
1.5 and
condition (i)’ is trivial. We have
˜ v(x,y)=( 1 .5x +1 .5)
·





9(x +1 )( 2 y − x +1 )
8
.
Thus, the necessary condition (ii) is not satisﬁed, because x>yimplies
Z x
y





Thus, there is no monotonic equilibrium.
Now, we will show that there are multiple equilibria non-monotonic for this auction. Assume
that there exists a bell-shaped equilibrium and that, for each x,t h e r ea r et w ot y p e s ,f (x)a n d
g (x), such that P (ti)=x =
3−g(x)+f(x)−1.5
1.5 , which implies that g(x)=f (x)+1.5(1− x). (See
Figure 6).



















































































24 + 3x − x2¢
32
is increasing on [0,1].¥
Proof for Example 3 - Spectrum Auction


















































































































/N > 0, b = −
¡
s2 − s2¢
< 0, c = −(N − 1)
¡
s3 − s3¢



















It is elementary to obtain that, for a uniform distribution on [0,1]





3 : ax + by + cz < l
o
=
















































which is diﬀerentiable, with ˜ b0 (x)=[ ˜ v(x,x) − x]/x. Then, Theorem 3 tells us that there exists
an equilibrium in regular pure strategies for this auction if and only if
˜ v(x,x) − x =
½



























v1 (tj)= ˜ P−1 (x)

 > 0.
Depending on the values of sn, sn, for n =1 , 2, 3, the above expression can be positive or
negative. If it is always positive, ˜ b is increasing and it is the equilibrium of the indirect auction.
In the other case, there is no equilibrium without ties. For instance, a suﬃcient condition for
the existence of equilibrium in pure strategy is
s1
N − s2 − s3 N−1
N − 1 > 0.¥
Proof for Example 4 - Job Market
We assume that there are two players with unidimensional signals uniformly distributed on




− b(ti − m)
2 .
We will consider two cases.





1 − 2m +2 ti,i f 0 6 ti <m
1 − 2ti +2 m,i f m 6 ti < 2m






am + c(1 − y) − b(1 − x − m)
2 , if 0 6 x,y < 1 − 2m
am + c(1 − y) − b
4 (1 − x)
2 , if 0 6 y<1 − 2m 6 x 6 1
(a + c)m − b(1 − x − m)
2 , if 0 6 x<1 − 2m 6 y 6 1
(a + c)m − b
4 (1 − x)
2 , if 1 − 2m 6 x,y 6 1.





















which is increasing if c 6
2b(m+1)









6am +3 c(1 + 2m) − 2b
¡














(1 − 2m)[2c − b(1 − 2m)]
4x








whose derivative can be simpliﬁed to
˜ b0 (x)=−





Since the term x2 (3 − 2x) is increasing, the bidding function will be increasing if and only if





We conclude that in the case of m<1/2, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in regular















ti,i f 0 6 ti < 2m − 1,
1 − 2m +2 ti,i f 2 m − 1 6 ti <m






am + cy − b(x − m)
2 , if 0 6 x,y < 2m − 1
am + cy − b
4 (1 − x)
2 , if 0 6 y<2m − 1 6 x 6 1
(a + c)m − b(x − m)
2 , if 0 6 x<2m − 1 6 y 6 1
(a + c)m − b
4 (1 − x)
2 , if 2m − 1 6 x,y 6 1.




















which is increasing in the considered interval if and only if c > 2
3b(m − 2).
For x>2m − 1,
˜ b(x)=




12(a + c)m − b
¡










Following the same procedure of the ﬁrst case, ˜ b0 (x) > 0,∀x ∈ [2m − 1,1] if and only if
c > −
2b(2m − 1)(1 + m)
3
.
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